In my new book I defend atheism, but I was not always a nonbeliever. In fact, I was in a religious order for 12 years, leaving only just before I would have had to take the final vows. In fact, I only became an atheist recently after accepting a John Templeton grant to apply the yet untapped resources of ethics and political philosophy to the problem of evil. Work on this Templeton grant ultimately resulted in my developing the argument I will be summarizing here, set out in more detail in my book. Moreover, if anyone is successful in poking a hole in my argument, I am happy to give up being an atheist. My commitment to atheism is only as strong as the soundness and validity of my argument. Undercut my argument and poof, at least in my case, no more atheist.
My argument begins by considering whether there would be a justification for God’s not preventing—hence permitting—the final stage of significant and especially horrendous evil actions of wrongdoers, the stage where the wrongdoers would be imposing their evil consequences on their victims, for example, just before the infliction of torture by a would-be torturer. I assume that there would be a justification, at least in terms of freedom, for God’s not interfering with the imaginings, intending, and even the taking of initial steps by wrongdoers toward bringing about significant and even horrendous evil consequences on their would-be victims. I also assume that there would be a justification, at least in terms of freedom, for God’s not interfering when the consequences of immoral actions are not significantly evil. So here is the question I want to consider: Is there a greater good justification for God’s permitting significant and especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions?
To answer this question it is important to see that goods that could be provided to us are of two types: goods to which we have a right and goods to which we do not have a right.
Goods to Which We Have a Right
Providing us with goods to which we have a right is also a way of preventing evil. More precisely, the provision of such goods by those who could easily do so without violating anyone’s rights is a way of preventing the evil of the violation of people’s rights.1 Thus, if I provide someone with food and lodging to which that person has a right when I alone (other than God) can easily do so, I prevent that person from suffering an evil. Correspondingly, the nonprovision of goods to which we have a right is also a way of doing evil; more precisely, the nonprovision of such goods by those who could easily provide them without violating anyone’s rights would itself be morally evil.2 Thus, if I do not provide someone with the food and lodging to which that person has a right when I alone (other than God) can easily do so, my omission, which is morally equivalent to a doing here, is also morally evil.
In addition, goods to which we are entitled are either first-order goods that do not logically presuppose the existence of some serious wrongdoing (like the freedom from brutal assault) or second-order goods that do logically presuppose the existence of some serious wrongdoing (like providing aid to a victim of brutal assault). For all such first-order goods to which we are entitled, the basic moral requirement that governs their provision is:
Moral Evil Prevention Requirement I: Prevent rather than permit significant and especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions without violating anyone’s rights (a good to which we have a right) when that can easily be done.3 […]
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